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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Kim, Dong hyun 
 
 
 
 
 
Consensus building has often been used as an effective means to resolve dispute among 
interest groups in a highly democratic societies. As Republic of Korea has shifted from its 
dictatorship to a fully recognized democracy since the 90s, demands for achieving successive 
consensus building have started to gain recognition. Yet, many attempts failed in reaching a 
consensus in Republic of Korea when a “highly political involvement” took place. This study 
strives to get into the epicenter of such failures-The National Assembly in Republic of Korea, 
“the arena of politics”, where it is infamous for an excessive Win-Lose power struggle. Of 
course, sometimes it may be the nature of politics to strategically neglect the consensus 
building with the rivaling parties. However, National Assembly in Republic of Korea seems 
excessive in attempting to obstruct the opponent parties that “consensus building often does 
not reflect the needs of their people. Such excessive tendency of political rivalry combined 
with the reality of non-existence in having an effective consensus building mechanism may 
risk neglecting the needs of their people. Therefore an effective method of consensus building 
is demanded in ROK’s legislature system. Through the ROK media law passing case, this 
study attempts to articulate the current structural flaws which obstruct gaining an effective 
consensus building mechanism in the National Assembly. By identifying what and why it is 
so difficult in having an effective consensus in the “political arena” of ROK, this paper would 
contribute to the future discovery for obtaining better modeling and alternatives   
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1. Introduction 
Consensus building has often been used as an effective means to resolve dispute among 
interest groups in a democratic society. Specific cases could be exemplified such as 
environmental conflict resolution regarding the Snoqualmie Dam dispute in the 1970s U.S. 
(Kim Dong young, E-daily) As Republic of Korea has shifted from its dictatorship to a fully 
recognized democracy since the 90s, various interest groups have enjoyed fully exerting their 
positional bargaining in certain issues. This in the mean time created, “Conflicts” between 
opposing interest parties. Such mood also has signaled its society to embrace an effective 
consensus building to resolve disputes democratically. In accordance with the “need”, ROK 
government has tried to implement consensus building in various issues. Successive cases as 
the relocation of Defense Security Command or the diesel automobile usage and Special Law 
on Air Improvement on Metropolitan Area prove that consensus building in South Korea 
could also effectively be implemented. However, there are still more prevalent failures such 
as the NEIS, the Hantan River Dam or Installment of Jeju Naval bases that speculate 
consensus building being too ideal for the reality in South Korea. Common aspects of such 
failures are that they were all involved in value-led conflicts, failed in obtaining an effective 
mediator and the most important, having political involvement in due process. (Kim Dong 
young, Et al.)The case in ROK Media Law shares alongside with these commonalities as 
well as having additional unique features. The following differences are as below.  
Unique Aspects of the Case in Passing of ROK Media Law 
i. The place that involved conflict was in the national assembly itself where majority-
rule is the norm in the final process of passing the law 
ii.  Actors in the conflict process were “Agents” representing the “Principals” that would 
eventually be affected by the Law. 
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iii. Role of mediator, chairman of the national assembly, is in a difficult position to act 
neutral 
iv. Chairman of the national assembly has direct authority to use introduction of bill 
without the passing of the committee 
v. Characteristic of dead line for a possible agreement was short and easy to be 
manipulated  
vi. Joint fact finding involves highly political outcome  
vii. Within the discourse process, verbal and physical means of offences (filibuster)  were 
implemented among party members  
Since, most cases in South Korea which failed in consensus building involves political 
involvement, the subject on reviewing the ROK Media Law passing could be the cornerstone 
for suggesting why it is difficult to resolve conflict in political arena.  Also, since most 
policy case studies in South Korea involves government vis-à-vis civil organization, civil 
organization vis-à-vis civil organization where Government acts as mediator, it is important 
to note that there are very few studies focusing on the conflict process model in the legislative 
sector.  Previous studies such as “Research for Policy Decision-making Governance on 
Conflict Management Broadcasting-Communication Convergence” (Korea Information 
Strategy Development Institute, 2008) or “White Paper on Broadcasting-Communication 
Transfusion Initiative” (Office for Government Policy Coordination, 2008), all focus the role 
of government in implementing the policy.  However, by studying how ROK Media Law 
making process failed in resolving conflict, this dissertation may suggest better understanding 
for the future studies on political consensus building model. Moreover, conflict regarding the 
IPTV related clauses could be defined as conflict among government agencies and the 
national assembly. Therefore, IPTV issues would not be specifically discussed in this paper.   
3 
 
2. Traits of decisions making process in ROK National Assembly  
Before, developing the thesis, current traits of decision making process in ROK National 
assembly should be previously mentioned. By doing so, it is easy to understand the 
hypothesis and statement of problem in the case of ROK Media Law passing. The ineffective 
decision making-such as procrastination, filibustering, abuse of direct authority, etc within the 
National Assembly are nothing new of stratagems in the ROK political arena. On the contrary, 
the end-result of the ineffective decision making process is rather encouraged by the political 
actors in order to elicit best optimal selection. According to Park chanpyo, “ROK National 
Assembly is in a status where conflict management is yet realized. In the Authoritarian 
regime it lacked basic frameworks for conflict managements to be rooted, resulting in an 
irrational development of conflicts with physical confrontations… After, the democratized era, 
still it has failed to be rooted as a system.. Such failure could be attributed to the political 
culture within the National Assembly” (Park, 1997) 
Especially during the 15
th
 National Assembly, confrontation regarding the ground regulation 
of forming the National Assembly, stipulating specific time frame of forming committee 
members, critically delayed the opening of the National Assembly.  
Moreover, the abuse of direct authority by the chairman of National Assembly and 
filibustering by the opposing party to obstruct the abuse is a well witnessed phenomenon in 
ROK National Assembly. Such tendency of resorting to irrationality of force makes the 
National Assembly ineffective in discussing the agenda “target-centered”. By referring from 
the past trends, it could be assumed that National Assembly in Republic of Korea seems 
excessive in attempting to obstruct the opponent parties that “consensus building often does 
not reflect the needs of their people. Such excessive tendency of political rivalry combined 
with the reality of non-existence in having an effective consensus building mechanism risk 
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neglecting the needs of their people. The reasons under such structural problems of trends 
could be roughly assumed as following: Firstly, procrastination of forming a National 
Assembly Committee is due to the discontent among parties to appoint opponents as 
Chairman of the National Assembly and the heads of each committee. This is due to the 
abuse of direct authority which these roles obtain, to lay a bill when consensus is not reached.  
Although, chairman and heads are assumed neutral for a fair facilitating and mediating to 
take place in the process, procrastination proves that either such expected roles in reality does 
not function properly or at least the roles are perceived unreliable among party members. 
Secondly, since the power of direct authority could compromise excluding proper 
deliberation process, discontented members may resort on filibustering even after the 
chairman or the heads of each committee are appointed. Such filibustering escalates conflicts 
among party members which greatly blurs the agenda deliberation to a force-led power 
struggle. In the following sections of this thesis, the traits of the ROK National Assembly 
would be closely studied. Moreover, it would clarify whether the assumptions explained 
above are justified by testing the hypothesis. 
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Table No.1 <Law Draft Passed by usage of Direct Authority since 1993 ~2000> 
     
Date Agenda Majority Party Facilitator Notes 
1993.12.2 
1994 Fiscal 
planning 
draft 
Minja  
Hwang, 
nakjoon  
Lee mansup chairman refuses 
facilitation 
1994.12.2 
1995 Fiscal 
Planning 
draft 
Minja  
Lee chun 
goo  
passed from local press room of 
the plenary meeting using 
wireless mike 
1995.5.5 
Integrated 
Election Law 
Revision 
Minja  
Hwang 
nakjoo 
Non-participation of Democratic 
Party 
1996.12.26 
11 law drafts 
including 
Labor 
Relation law 
revision 
ShinHangook 
Oh sae 
seng  
Law passed in 6AM morning 
1999.1.6~1.8 
110 law 
drafts 
including 
Korea-Japan 
Fishing 
Treatment 
Ratification 
Gookmin Hoiee, Jaminryun 
Park joon 
kyu  
Non-participation of Grand 
National Party 
2000.7.24 
National 
Assembly 
Law Revision 
draft 
Gookhoiwoonyung Committee 
Cheon 
jeongbae 
Lee mansup chairman refuses use 
direct authority 
<Korea National Assembly Development Research Committee, table 4> 
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3. Historical Background  
3.1.Initiative of Revision  
Revision of ROK Media Law was proposed by the Grand National Party in December 3
rd
 
2008 and with controversy in the due- process, had passed the law in July 22
nd
 2009. The 
related laws include 7 categories in “Newspaper Law”, “Press Mediation Law”, 
“Broadcasting Law”, “Internet Multimedia Broadcasting Business Law”, “Radio Wave Law”, 
“and Special Law on Transfer of Ground Wave Television Broadcasting to Digital ”,“ Law on 
Promotion of Information Communications Networks and Information Protection Law” 
The initial proposal specifically allowed the capital investors to gain up to 20% of “Ground 
Wave TV” stock share, 49% of “Special Coverage Channel” and “General Program Service”.  
Also in the case of “Foreign Capitals”, it allowed 20% of stock share in “Special Coverage 
Channel” and “General Program Service”1 
Table No.2 
    <Comparison between Conventional and Proposal of Media related Law> 
 
(Assorted from various Newspapers)  
                                           
1 In Korean it is called “Jong Hap Bodo Channel” 
Conventional Revised Conventional Revisied Conventional Revisied Conventional Revisied
30% 49% Prohibited 20% Prohibited 20% Prohibited Prohibitted
30% 30% 20%
49% 49% 20%
- - - - 49% 49% 49% 49%
- - (Abolish) 33% 49% 33% 49%
- - - - - - 49% 49%
49% Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Ground Wave
TV
Satilite
Broadcast
General
Progarm
Service
Special
Coverage
Program
Provider
General
Program
Provider
Owners /
Objects
30%
General Cable
Program
Individual Stock Share Conglomerates Newspaper / Broadcast Foreign Capital
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Regarding the cross-ownership issues, previously ROK Government, since the 1980’s, had 
prohibited any cross-ownership between “Newspaper” and “Broadcasting” Also, the 
conventional laws limited “Newspaper Company” or “Broadcasting Media” to have rights in 
owning Cable TV’s general service channel as well as “Special Coverage Channel2”3. The 
rationale behind this prohibition clause of cross-ownership and the limitation of stock-sharing 
was based on “broadcasting public interest theory” (Office of Prime Minister,2008,pp340-
356). According to the white paper published by the Prime Minister Office, “Traditionally, 
broadcast is considered in a public sphere where certain individuals or organizations are not 
allowed to monopolize, based on ‘scarcity of frequency channels’ and thus the ‘limitation of 
usable channels’” (p340) Due to such characteristic, broadcasting sphere must pursue public 
virtue in “Enlarging access of political, economic, socio-cultural minorities”, “Inhibiting 
monopoly and centralization of public opinion”, “Induce public interest based programs in 
order to relax dominion of commercial programs” (p340).  Such treatment of public 
concerns is also well proved in Mancur Olson’s thesis of “The logic of collective Action”. In 
his study he clearly states that, “Under an environment where the scale is small or provided 
by a selective inducement and the interest group is structured while its power increases, it 
eventually turns out to become a distribution coalition where it poses to lobby with the 
government and obtain preferred service to their own group”- “Such rationale devastates the 
wealth of the society and it is the role of the government is to prevent such group rationale 
activity” (Olson, Mancur 1971).  As the conventional Media was in this category of small 
                                           
2
 “Special Coverage Channel” in Korean is “Bodo Junmun chaenul” which refers to media that merely covers 
NEWS. Equivalent examples in Foreign Medias are BBC, CNN 
3
 In the conventional “ROK Newspaper Law”, clause 15 dictates that Newspaper companies cannot cross-own 
Broadcasting companies. Also it states that share owner who gains more than 50% of the broadcasting company 
cannot own more than 50% share of other Newspaper companies. Moreover, in the conventional “ROK 
Broadcasting Law” it dictates that “Jonghap Ilganji”, General Daily News papers, or “News Tongsinsa 
insa”, News Communication Companies, are not allowed for act of cross-ownership nor gain percentage of 
stock share in Ground wave Broadcasting and General service Channel Business.  
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scale environment, it was natural for the government to concern its characteristic in 
protecting the public interest. Nevertheless, recent technological advancement has drastically 
changed the Media Environment. As technological leap has made it possible for Analog 
information to be converted to digital, demands of convergence of the Analog and digital 
sectors has come to rise. With surging demands of convergence, the previous conventional 
media law that distinctively regulated each media sector became obsolete to reflect the reality 
of Today’s Media Trend. Such obsolete perimeter between broadcast and communication as 
well as newspaper along with introduction of new types of media, digital cable TV, Satellite 
TV, DMB, IPTV, obscured the conventional legitimacy of “Scarcity of Frequency channels” 
creating varieties of choices for viewers. On the other hand, excessive protection by the 
conventional media laws themselves created a bulwark of entrance for new media competitor 
to enter the market
4
. With such an oligarchic structure, concerns were raised of the media 
being occupied by small numbers of existing channels which eventually limits the 
representation of variety of opinions.  
In such circumstance, the ROK Government’s main target was to imbue competition among 
conventional media such as making News paper industries enter the broadcasting sector 
(Such management until now was prohibited) as well as loosing up restriction for large 
capital owners to participate in the media industries. By doing so, the government attempts to 
yield the following results- 
  Introduce various selections of contents for the viewers 
  By introducing IPTV, incubate media to smear into the digital ubiquitous 
environment enhanced by Internet, Social Media Service and the recent “SMART 
                                           
4
 Presently, ROK has only 4 ground cable broadcasting stations. (1 National and 3 private firms)- 
KBS, MBC,SBS,EBS 
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Industry” 
  Promote deliberative democracy through providing various source of channel 
 Allow capital corporate funds to gain access in the broadcasting media 
Especially, regarding its ramification of positive effects in promoting democracy, 
environment of the Media convergence would be expected to induce five new values. Firstly, 
unlike the conventional media in which citizens were passive objects of information, the leap 
of technology in media convergence will give “more authority of freedom” to the citizens and 
consumers. (Korea Information pp185) Secondly, the Media convergence would alter civil 
participation from a limited deliberation to a various forms of deliberation. The paper points 
out that “Traditional norms of deliberation had not only limited structure of individual 
deliberation but also had characteristics of being mobilized or ‘Interpellation’ by certain 
media frame or ideologies. However, “means of choice through selective searching would 
provide users to directly participate or become a part of the programs, deciding the contents 
and agenda (pp186). Thirdly, since conventional media means such as Newspaper, broadcast 
have provided “limited information through small number of platform, “centralization” of 
opinions or preferences have been centralized. Due to such penchant, “civil deliberation has 
been centralized with homogeneity”. Nevertheless, convergence in media environment would 
“induce various converged media-based information, which unlike the conventional media 
would deliver “diverse and sporadic participation” of users who would participate in the 
contents making. (pp187). Moreover, such participation would create new values of 
“Creativity” based on public interest while, conferring values of “responsibility” for users to 
observe such public values.  
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3.2.Positions of Opposition Interest Groups  
However, unlike such expectations, harsh criticism was raised by the opposition parties 
against the Grand National Party’s proposal. Two important conflicts of themes were raised 
as below.  
 Issues regarding the Cross-ownership of Newspaper and Broadcasting  
 Issues regarding the propositional level of stock shares allowed for capital investors 
to gain in Ground-wave Television Broadcastings and Special Coverage Channels 
The criticism generally underlined that pro-capitalistic law would generate oligarchic media, 
limiting the general public to deliberate. (Hangook, 2009) 
Especially regarding the propositional level of stock shares, Hankyurei Newspaper in 
December 12
th
 2008 Editorial quotes as below. 
“Especially, South Korea where public opinion market is still radically manipulated, merely 
with market logic, the law would more harm the public opinion market when the media 
conversion actually takes place... Such act only could be interpreted as the government and 
the ruling party giving rewards to strong conservative news media which had cooperated 
their regime change successful” “Media Law revision which for the means of securing 
regime should be stopped while the national assembly should carefully treat the issue by 
considering the public opinion monopoly and the damage of public characteristic in the 
Media that would eventually affect our society” (Hankyurei Editorial, Dec 2nd ,2008)     
Also, the National Media Labor Union
5
 went on a general strike from Dec. 26
th
 2008.  
According to the National Media Labor Union’s Directive 6, it clarified that “The revision 
bill proposed by Grand National Party, if passed, would bring monopoly of public opinion 
                                           
5
 National Media Labor Union (Jun Gook NoJo) is the largest media related labor union under Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions, one of the two largest labor unions in Republic of Korea. The National Media 
Labor Union accepts membership from News reporters, Producers, Engineers who works in Newspaper and 
Broadcasting Companies.  
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and back-scratching alliance between power and capital… the general strike which starts 
from 26
th
 would continue regardless of whether the bill is laid before the national assembly 
and Grand National Party rescind the bill” (E-daily,Dec 28th ,2008).  
Regarding the position of the opposing parties, Jung Se Kyun, the chairman of the 
Democratic Party, being largest among the opposition parties, states as below.  
“Failing to bulwark the passing of Grand National Parties budget plan bill, the opposition 
party would take clearly different stance from the previous failure… unlike budget plan, other 
laws (such as Media laws) have different characteristics”  “legislation of anti-democratic 
laws involving the monitoring of the people, splitting sides, and giving preferential treatments 
toward conglomerates should not be passed in this year nor in the next years… The attitude 
of the opposition party toward fiscal planning and these laws is definitely different”. The 
chairman forewarned that the opposition party would “resort to force” (PreSSian, Dec 15th. 
2008) 
In his other exclusive interview with IlyoSisa in Dec. 23
rd
 article, he describes strategy of 
Democratic Party against the Grand National Party’s Medial Law Proposal.  
“The 7 evil laws to control the media should be struggled for the preservation of Democratic 
order. Last Dec. 16
th
 (We) have met with representatives of “National Media Labor Union”, 
“Media Active” which is composed of 50 civil NGOs in the Yoeido national assembly. On this 
day, I have stated that (Media Law) is a National problem and the People’s problem. This 
overpasses the interest of the party and directly involves the Democracy of ROK and the 
competiveness of the Nation. How could we standstill witnessing President Lee, Myung bak’s 
regime with only 1 year in power regressing 20,30 years of the current situation. We would 
fight with certain awareness. Although our seats in the national assembly is small, but we are 
the largest opposing party attaining 80 seats. With bipartisanship between other opposing 
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parties we would obstruct the 7 evil (media) laws being passed. Also, we would meet with the 
representatives of the Media interest groups such as National Media Labor Union, Media Act, 
etc and co act to obstruct the Grand National Parties Proposal” (IlyoSisa, Dec.23rd 2008) 
In short, the concerns raised upon were regarding the reality that small numbers of newspaper 
companies occupies more that 50% of the Newspaper market, if the media law promises 
these Newspaper companies entering the broadcasting sector, it would result in broadcasting 
being dependent upon large capitals. This result in the meantime would expedite monopoly 
among large Newspaper companies eventually damaging the of selection of variety of choice, 
escalating insolvency to small-medium sized Newspaper companies and reducing the role of 
Media as a public voice, especially toward large conglomerates.   
 
3.3.Due Process of Bill Passing.  
As the Chairman of the Democratic Party forewarned, in December 26
th
 2008, the 
Democratic Party congressmen occupied the Assembly plenary session, filibustering any 
attempt of laying the bill.  
With filibustering taking place, with the order by Kim Hyung Oh, Chairman of the National 
Congress, trials of force-led disbanding was attempted in January 6
th
 2009. Regardless, in 
February 25
th
 2009 chairman of Culture and Broadcasting Committee, congressmen Koh, 
Heong Gil with “Direct authority clause” 
6
laid bill to the committee. However, both ruling 
party and opposing party reached an agreement in March 2
nd
 2009, stating that they would 
cooperate to deal the passing of laws in the coming June by “receiving public opinions from 
the people of ROK”  
Such abrupt change of tide in agreeing to negotiate seemed to bring hiatus to the conflict 
                                           
6
 In Korean. Jik Gwon Sang Jeong 
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escalation.  
From March 13
th
 2009, by recommendation from both sides of ruling and opposing parties, 
20 members were designated under the name of “Media Development National Committee” 
From March 13
th
 discussions, experts panel, public hearings were held. However, right before 
the final version of documents was to be released in the committee members recommended 
by the Grand National Party withdrew from the committee. The reason behind this 
withdrawal was the disagreement of implementing poll survey. Grand National Party stated 
that in the initial consensus document that was agreed in March 2
nd
 2009, did not state any 
words of “implementing poll survey”  
With joint-fact approach being failed, Democratic Party refused participating in the “June 
Interim National Assembly”. Park, Gun Hye ex-chairman of the Grand National Party, 
stepped in as a mediator to bring a settlement. The proposal suggested reducing the 
Newspaper and Broadcasting companies’ General Service Channel stock share by 30%, while 
a clause to limit the “Share of Audience Ratio” by 30% should be added.  Responding to the 
settlement proposal, Grand National Party gave out a revision proposal of limiting the “Share 
of Audience Ratio” by 30% while compromising to delay the cross-ownership of Newspaper-
Broadcasting until 2012. On the other hand, The Democratic Party, responded by proposing 
alternatives of lowering the “Share of Audience Ratio” below 25%.  
Chairman of Congress, Kim Hyung Oh implied using “Direct Authority” to lay bill if no 
consensus was made before July 25
th
 2009, the date when the “June Interim National 
Assembly” ends.  
With a time frame being limited, Grand National Party, then changes their initial revised 
proposal as a positional bargaining. The contents was greatly retreated from what the 
opposing parties expected, in which it returned to the original design of allowing cross-
14 
 
ownership of Newspaper and Broadcasting companies.  
As no compromise was reached between the parties, vice chairman of Congress, Lee, Yoon 
Sung with the “Direct Authority” laid bill and passed the Media Law by voting in July 22nd 
2009. 
7
. The Democratic Party members, during the voting process could not participate due 
to their filibustering to stop members entering the plenary meeting place where the voting 
was held. However Voters entered in a different route which made the vote possible.  
 
3.4.Aftermath of Bill Passing  
Protesting the result, the opposition party members filed constitutional petitions to the 
constitutional court against the chairman and vice chairman of National Assembly while 
petitioning the confirmation of legal nullification of the laws passed. Following is the abstract 
of the Constitutional Court’s verdicts.  
 
<Summary of the verdicts of the Constitutional Court> 
The Constitutional Court sentences verdicts in 2009 October 29
th
 over the case filed 
regarding the incident of authority dispute between congressmen and chairman of the 
National Assembly as following: On the act of declaring the passing of the following law, 
“Proposal of Overall Revision of Newspaper Law on Guaranteeing Freedom and its Role” 
by 7:2 opinions, on the act of declaring the passing of the following law “Proposal of 
Partial Revision of Broadcasting Law” by 6:3 opinions concludes that the acts had 
violated against the authority of congressmen to deliberate and vote over the proposed 
law. However, the Constitutional Court dismisses the petition over confirmation of 
                                           
7 The “Direct Authority” or “Jik-Gwon Sang jeong” was entrusted from the Chairman Kim Hyeong 
Oh 
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authority violation through the defendant’s (Chairman of the National Assembly) act in 
declaring the passing of “Proposal of Partial Revision of Internet Multimedia 
Broadcasting Business Law” and “Proposal of Partial Revision of Financial Holding 
Company Law” by 5:4 opinions. Moreover, regarding the petition of legal nullification 
confirmation on the act of declaring the passing of the 4 law proposals mentioned above, 
the constitutional court sentences verdicts as following: Regarding the case of the 
Newspaper law Proposal by 6:3 opinions, regarding the case of the Broadcasting Law 
Proposal by 7:2 opinions, regarding the case of Internet Multimedia Law Proposal and 
Financial Holding Company Law Proposal by unanimous opinions, sentences verdict to 
dismiss the cases. Regarding the petition against the other defendant (Vice chairman of 
the National Assembly), the Constitutional Court dismisses the case due to the reason that 
the plaintiffs do not have the eligibility to file against the defendant (Vice chairman of the 
National Assembly)  
(Constitutional Court 2009헌라8) 
To summarize and interpret the verdict of the constitutional court, it was explicit that the 
deliberation process of conflict resolution was not held properly. The role of the mediator, 
Chairman of the National Assembly, did not keep the deliberation process amply nor the 
voting procedure fairly stating his act unconstitutional. However, the constitutional court also 
states, that it is not in the realm of prerogative of the Constitutional Court to nullify the role 
of the National Assembly in passing the bill. Therefore, regardless of the process being 
unconstitutional, the passing of the law stays effective.  
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4. Literature Review  
Since very few studies have been conveyed on consensus building process in the legislative 
system of Republic of Korea, there are limits in borrowing a well founded theory in 
developing the thesis. Nevertheless, Studies conveyed by the Korea National Assembly 
Development Research Committee gives some rough theoretical frame work that would be 
helpful in glimpsing on how the National Assembly consensus building process works.  
According to the study conveyed by the Korea National Assembly Development Research 
committee on “Negotiation Process of forming a National Assembly”, it analyzes the 
empirical data from 13
th
 to 16
th
 National Assembly of each party’s negotiation strategies in 
making a consensus for the formation of committee members. The study shows that 
consensus tends to be reached when the size of the ruling party and the opposing parties have 
nearly symmetric size. (National Assembly’s Negotiation Process , 2005). It concludes that, 
the National Assembly’s politics after the democratization in ROK is a “politics of 
compromise within radical collision” (pp161). Particularly, radical collision that leads to the 
denial of forming the committee of the congress is a very rare phenomenon which is found 
only in ROK politics. It draws hypothesis that a party initiates bargaining strategies to 
maximize its politics and powers. With such strategies, in the bargaining process of forming a 
committee, rises competition, while radical competition frequently leads to the paralysis of 
the National Assembly. However, it concludes that even in such situation, the paralysis status 
would invite public criticism which subsequently makes actors avoid overall destruction of 
the system and therefore, would balance into an “interdependence game” for consensus 
building. In analyzing the ROK media law case, the theoretical frame works of the previous 
studies above would be borrowed to judge whether the case had a consensus building 
situation. For instance, it would be helpful in understanding why minority parties resort on 
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filibustering or coalition to galvanize public criticism when majority powers merely strives 
into supremacy of voting power. However since the limit of the previous studies were 
narrowly scoped within the formation process and not the actual law making bargaining such 
as the ROK media law passing, different hypothesis should be found on why the consensus 
building failed. Also, since most successful case in meeting a consensus in the previous 
literatures were presented when the ruling party and the other opposing parties had nearly 
symmetrical size, asymmetric strength of power in ROK media law passing should have 
different approach in articulating the failure.  
Regarding the mediation and facilitating roles as well as the designing of joint fact finding in 
ROK national assembly, another study developed by the Korea National Assembly 
Development Research Committee, “Research on the Leadership of the Chairman and the 
Management of the National Assembly” is well depicted. As Susskind, L and J. Thomas 
Lamer is a well respected scholar in the designing of consensus building, the ideal model of 
Joint-Fact-Finding described by these scholar must be compared with reality depicted in the 
ROK national assembly study. Such analogy would be helpful in developing the hypothesis 
of this thesis since it gives clear understanding of the gap between reality and ideal of the 
contemporary politics in ROK National Assembly. Also, Moore, Christopher’s work “The 
Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict” (Chapter 2) had been studied 
for identifying various types of mediators, in order to clarify what mediation style had 
efficacy in the ROK media law passing case.   
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5. Hypothesis and Research Methods  
Under a proportional representation system, ruling party which exceeds 50% of voting seats 
while the Chairman of National Assembly had previously affiliated with the prevailing party, 
procedural approach of consensus building is difficult to be achieved. Such circumstance was 
also shown in the ROK Media Law passing. Of course, in politics, it is not always necessary 
to reach a consensus. Nevertheless, as with ROK Media Law case along with many other 
issues in the current ROK National Assembly, the consensus reaching processes are often 
blurred by violence of physical or verbal offences eventually escalating the conflict more 
difficult level to be resolved. Such cases of implementation in forces raised question on why 
an issue-targeted discourse which could be the basic outline for a rational conflict resolving, 
not rooted as a norm within the National Assembly. As response to such questions, this paper 
attempts to answer by proving the following hypothesis: the current congress system has 
structural problems within the national congress which makes the system difficult to achieve 
consensus building. Such structural problems are that actors along with the mediator easily 
break the ground rules which guarantee credibility for a proper consensus building to take 
place. This could be found by the mediator, in this case the Chairman, not giving credibility 
as keeping a neutral role, joint fact finding group’s ground rules deliberately being neglected, 
and usage of verbal or physical offense such as filibustering by the actors. To analyze the 
mentioned structural problems, sources from the media which mention the opinions of the 
actors and mediators would be studied. Also previous academic journals or reports dealing 
with the negation process in the National assembly would be used.  
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6. Question to be addressed / Statement of the Problem  
The ROK Media Law Passing is an exemplar case of how difficult it is to implement a 
successive conflict management process within political dynamics. This thesis, would attempt 
to find out what were the deciding factors that yielded such outcome by addressing crucial 6 
questions. 
① Is the bargaining power (In the ROK Media case, number of seats occupied by each 
party) a crucial factor in deciding the position of Grand National Party to easily 
obliterate procedural step in consensus building? 
② In the ROK Media Case, how were the procedural steps of consensus building took 
place and why did some procedural such as joint-fact finding, mediation failed? 
③ Were there any role of mediator and facilitator and how effective were there role? 
④ If the conventional means to reach consensus building proved to be ineffective, what 
structural problems of the legislative system in Korea were revealed through the 
ROK Media Law passing?  
⑤  Could there be suggested as an alternative to redeem the structural flaw? 
 
In the beginning of the 18
th 
national assembly the ruling party, Grand National Party, 
occupied 169 seats (Local constituency: 131, Proportional representation 22) out of 296 
which exceeds half of the total seats. Also the former member of Grand National Party Kim 
Hyung Oh was elected as the “chairman of the national assembly” As explained in the brief 
history, the unequivocal size may have influenced the positional bargaining of Grand 
National Party to neglect procedural process for negotiation to take place. Such assumption is 
that since the ruling party occupies enough seats by themselves, it is an unnecessary choice of 
strategy to convene a negotiation. In such, asymmetric number of seats while having 
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chairman of national assembly as the former party member of the majority number, Bill is 
frequently passed in the ROK national assembly without any consensus process being 
reached between the minority parties. Such analysis was also assumed in the result of ROK 
Media Law passing. In the Case analysis, I would test whether this assumption lies valid of 
yielding an “uncompromising position” that bulwarked initial condition of consensus 
building (Q1.) 
 
As for the following second to third questions, this thesis would articulate that the consensus 
building approach actually did take place mostly in accordance with textual manual. However, 
since it is also clear that tri-partisan task force of “Joint Fact Finding” failed while, role of 
mediator did not properly function, I would attempt to articulate what factors affected the 
failures (Q2) 
Also, regarding question 3, with the preset condition being difficult to make a consensus, I 
would try to find out what other means (such as efficacy of mediator and facilitator) were 
used to reach a consensus (Q3) 
Lastly, question 4 to 5, by proving that “Media Law Case” was highly expected to fail due 
to the weak mediating and facilitating ability of the chairman of the National Assembly as 
well as obscure role of the mediator, this paper attempts to seek any implication for future 
studies. (Q4, Q5) 
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7. Case Analysis 
7.1. Assessment of Initial Condition of Consensus Building  
To prove that the hypothesis that the current congress system has structural problems within 
the national congress which makes the system difficult to achieve consensus, it is important 
to address the first question: was the bargaining power (In the ROK Media case, number of 
seats occupied by each party) a crucial factor in deciding the position of Grand National Party 
to easily obliterate procedural step in consensus building? 
According to the study of negotiation process of forming National Assembly of the past from 
13
th
 to 16
th
 National Assembly, it gives empirical data that consensus building approach was 
positively engaged when the occupying seats of the “negotiation parties” were nearly 
symmetrical (National Assembly’s Negotiation Process , 2005). Formation of the National 
Assembly is the ground task for a newly elected National Assembly to be opened. Therefore 
forming a national assembly begins with the consensus being reached on the composing of 
committee members of each policy sectors and the formation of Chairman Committee. Of 
course, in the literature, it does not touch the overall process of negotiation structure in a 
National Assembly. However, it is important to note that the literature reveals the reality why 
parties strive to acquire head seats of the committees as well as attempting to appoint their 
affiliated members to the Chairman seat. This is because each head of committees has direct 
authority to lay law proposal to the plenary session when consensus in the committees is not 
met. Also, it is noteworthy that although, a Chairman should resign from the party he or she 
was affiliated, in order to prove neutrality in facilitating the National Assembly, harsh 
competition between parties shows that hidden influence and loyalty remains as a hinge when 
the National Assembly kicks off.  The study concludes that under such circumstances of 
asymmetry in power, the ruling party attempts “to take compromise and yielding” as a 
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positive strategy in order for the objectives of the government and the ruling party to be 
achieved. Nevertheless if a ruling party which already had taken over 2/3 of the overall 
voting seats   
8
, the ruling party does not feel such “compromises” with the opposing 
parties that the activity of the opposing parties becomes “listless” (pp26). Variable of 
possibility of consensus under such circumstance may be reached only if the excessive 
“uncompromising stance” of the majority party havocs public sentiment outside the National 
Assembly. Since the attitude of the majority party would invite public criticism of wrecking 
the activity of National Assembly, such attitude of the majority party would eventually 
destroy the “common benefit” to maintain a political infrastructure. Therefore, the majority 
party would seek to adjust the level of “uncompromising stance” (pp4) Going back to the 
question in judging how the ruling party, Grand National Party, set their position in the 18
th
 
National Assembly regarding the ROK Media Law passing, the proportion of seat occupancy 
in the 18
th
 National Assembly and during the plenary voting period should be analyzed. As 
table No.2 exemplifies, in the beginning of the 18
th
 National Assembly, Grand National Party 
gained 153 seats whereas Democratic Party gained 81. 
9
 Considering that the Chairman as 
well as the vice chairman resigned from the Grand National Party, the expected power 
balance of Grand National Party to the Democratic Party was roughly 151: 81 
As 2/3 of the overall eligible voting population is 198 seats, it could be concluded that Grand 
National Parties had an asymmetric power advantage. However, it could also be said that 
Grand National Party was not in a position to take unilateral non-compromising stance since 
their number did not meet over 2/3 of the total population. Such interpretation could explain 
why the Grand National Party, although prevailing in power, attempted to seek joint-fact 
                                           
8 2/3 of the overall over all seats of the National Assembly makes the proposal of Laws possible  
9 Since Non-Negotiation party cannot participate in the committees, number of their seats is 
only an important factor when the final voting process is initiated. 
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finding to reach consensus. Also, it could be explained why the Democratic Party used 
filibustering or verbal abuse to mobilize support from the public sentiment while coalescing 
with principal organizations such as National Media Labor Union to expedite the public rage. 
As referred above, with an inferior number of seats, galvanizing public sentiment is a viable 
option to draw approach of consensus building from the majority party.  
 
Table No 3 
 <Seat Occupancy of Each Party in National Assembly in 2008 and the voting period> 
Negotiation 
Group 
Name 
Year 2008 Result  
(18
th
 National Assembly) 
During the vote  
Total Seats Total Seats 
Grand 
National 
Party 
GNP 153 169 
Democratic  
Party 
DP 81 84 
Non-
Negotiation 
Group 
Chin 
Park 
- 5 
Jayu 
Sunjin  
18 18 
Mirae 
Heemang  
14 - 
MinJu 
Nodong  
5 5 
ChangJo 3 3 
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Hangook  
Jinbo 
Shin  
0 1 
Non-
Affiliated 
25 9 
Total 299 294 
<Source: Assorted from National Assembly Homepage> 
Secondly, it is legitimate to test whether the 153 seats of the Grand National Party stayed 
loyal to the Party’s leadership. It is a known fact that in a public dispute a mediator should be 
neutral to gain credibility among the disputed parties. However, the ROK Media Law case is 
unique because the role of the mediator was conveyed by a congress woman whose affiliation 
was with the Grand National Party. As mentioned in the historical background, Grand 
National Party’s approach greatly shifted whenever, former head of the Grand National Party, 
expressed concerns regarding the Grand National Party’s initial proposal. Also, her mediation 
proposal gave positive shift to the Democratic Party in reducing “non-compromising stance” 
to reengage the bargaining. Specific analysis of her role would be addressed in the later 
sections. In this section, I would limit the focus on proving that Grand National Party’s 
superiority in numbers was not the crucial factor that bulwarked the consensus building. On 
the contrary, Park Gun hye and her supporting congressmen had positioned to become an 
“independent actors” within the Grand National Party due to the long rivalry between 
President Lee Myung Bak’s supporters. Since politics is a dynamic process where loyalty 
could be easily swayed, thus exact number of her supporters is rather vague to be identified. 
However considering that one of the non-negotiation party “Jayu Sunjin Party” had openly 
declared loyalty to her leadership which accounts 18 seats along with hidden supporters 
within the Grand National party, her bargaining power to pass or revoke the proposal of Law 
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could not be underestimated. The expected numbers of the Congressmen loyal to Park Gun 
Hye within the Grand National Party according to HankookKyungJae Newspaper was 
assumed around “60 seats” (Hankook, July 2008). Such figure suggests that 39% of the 153 
seats that Grand National Party gained were unpredictable in supporting the initial proposal. 
Adding the seats of the non-negotiation party, Mirae Heemang, maximum of 78 seats were 
potential in supporting Park Gun hye’s decision. Combined with Democratic Party’s 81 Seats, 
the overall potential votes for vetoing could be estimated as 159. This clearly shows that 
number of superiority of the Grand National Party was not a crucial factor in deciding the 
position of Grand National Party to easily obliterate procedural step in consensus building. 
Therefore, consensus building for the Grand National party was not an optional but an 
optimal selection for the bills to be passed.  
 
7.2 Analysis on Consensus Building Structure  
Q2. ~ Q3. In the ROK Media Case, how were the procedural steps of consensus building took 
place and why did some procedural such as joint-fact finding, mediation failed? Also, what 
other options were implemented after the joint-fact finding failed? 
Proving that the Grand National Party needed consensus building to pass the law proposal, 
facilitation of the chairman to reach consensus, implementation on tri-partisan joint fact 
finding, attempting to suggest written documents of the outcome of the joint fact finding, 
conflict mediation were witnessed. Therefore, it could be said that the consensus building 
followed the textural approach nominally. However, regardless of such methods, the result 
turned out as a failure. In this section, this paper would attempt to find out why such means 
did not work effectively in meeting a consensus.  
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7.2.1. Dynamics of Joint-Fact Finding  
Since congressman Koh heng Gil, committee head of the “Culture, Sports, Tourism, 
Broadcasting and Communication Committee”, laid the proposals of the Grand National 
Party using “Direct Authority” to the committee, conflict rapidly escalated. Nevertheless due 
to the procrastination of Democratic Party in agreeing on the laying of the law proposal to the 
plenary session along with coalition between principal groups protesting outside the National 
assembly, agreement was reached in March 2
nd
 6:25 PM to delay the matter in “June Interim 
National Assembly” and to form a tri-partisan joint-fact finding committee to collect public 
opinions. Following is the 3 negotiation parties’, Grand National Party, Democratic Party and 
Sunjin and Changjo Coalition
10
, memorandum. The joint-fact finding group was later, 
termed “Media Development National Committee” implementing a 100 day public opinion 
survey. It is worthy to note that such joint-fact finding composed of civilians was the first 
precedential in the history of ROK National Assembly while the national assembly was 
amidst session.  
<Timelines of the Media Development National Committee Activities>  
 March 2nd 2009- Ruling party and Opposing parties agreeing in installing Media 
Development National Committee 
 March 13th 2009- 1st General meeting: Initiation of Media Development National 
Committee Joint Chairmen : Kang, sang hyun (Opposing Party’s recommendation) / Kim, 
woo ryong (Ruling Party’s recommendation)  
 March 29th  2009- Ground rule of facilitation discussed 
                                           
10 Although, Jayu Sunjin nor the Chanjo Hangook Party had eligibility for becoming a negotiation party, by 
combining seats they became eligible. Such tactics of forming a coalition is well implemented in contemporary 
ROK politics. . 
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 March 27th - Sub Committee “Woon Young So Wi” established
11
 
 April 3rd - 4th General meeting : Discussion on having 4 public hearings each by agendas 
and local areas   
 April 10th - 5th General meeting: Discussion on ground rules of Local public hearing  
 April 14th - 6th General meeting: Dispute among committee members on whether to 
initiate work shop and its methods  
 April 24th – 7th General meeting / division meeting: Due to the request of change of 
schedule by the ruling party members, work shop was not implemented.  
Discussions on schedules, possibility of real-time Internet broadcasting and releasing of 
stenographic records of the agenda and local public hearings were held.  
 May 1st – Agenda public hearings 
12
on “Cross-ownership of Newspapers and 
Broadcastings” held / 8th General meeting / 2nd division meeting․  
 May 6th – Busan local public hearing: 
13
Canceled in intermission due to the unilateral 
declaration of closing by joint chairman Kim, woo ryong.   
 May 8th – Agenda public hearing on “Restriction on Broadcasting Industry” held
14. 
        9
th
 General meeting 
15
/ 3
rd 
division meeting held.  
                                           
11
 In Korean, Woon Young So Wi : An sub-organization within the Media Development National Committee 
which was made to coordinate prior agendas which would later be laid in the general meeting as well as overall 
schedules etc. In other words, it acted in order to set the agenda of the general meeting. Two Chairmen and Two 
Assistant administrators were selected each among members recommended by the ruling and opposing party 
was selected (Media Development National committee, pp29)  
12 Date and location: May 1st 2009 from 10:00 AM in the conference room of Special Committee-
National Assembly Congressmen hall.  
  
13
 Date and location: May 6
th
 14:00 PM at Busan City hall media center. 
  
14
 Date and location: May 8
th
 10:00 AM in the conference room 101 of Special Committee-National Assembly 
Congressmen hall.  
  
15
Consensus reached of organizing Public Survey sub-committee: 2 people each selected from Ruling and 
Opposing parties.  
28 
 
 May 13th – Chunchun Local Public hearing held 
16
 
 May 15th – Agenda public hearing on “Internet Regulation and Freedom of expression.
17
 
            10
th
 General meeting: Committee recommended from Grand National party 
announcing that public survey is impossible-Escalation of conflict between  
 May 20th – Agenda public hearing on  
 May 20th – Gwangju Province Public hearing : Agenda prepared by the ruling party 
members were only prepared / Verbal offense occurred by public speaker  
 May 22nd – Agenda Public hearing on “ IPTV and regional characteristics”  
18 
             11
th
 General meeting: Disputed among whether to implement Public polling, 
fact finding research, and local area debate    
 June 5th – Consensus reached between ruling and opposing party’s assistant 
administrators of the “Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting and Communication 
Committee” to delay the ending of the “Media Development National Committee” to 
June 25
th
 : committee members of Grand National Party and Jayu Sunjin party having a 
separated unilateral meeting.  
 June 12th – 12th General meeting: Debate over implementation of public polling survey.  
 May 15th – 13th General meeting: Committee members of Grand National Party refusing 
the implementation of public poll survey. 
May 17
th
 2009 – 14th General Meeting: Denial of public polling survey led to the overall 
retire of committee members recommended from Democratic Party and Changjo Hangook 
                                           
16
 Date and location: May 13
th
 14:00 PM in General meeting room of Gangwon Development Gongsa 
17
 Date and location: May 15
th
 10:00 PM in AM in the conference room 101 of Special Committee-National 
Assembly Congressmen hall.  
 
18
 Date and location: May 22
nd
 10:00 AM in the International conference room of Incheon Comprehensive 
Cultural Art Hall  
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Party. Media Development National Committee virtually dismantled. 
 
<Content of memorandum of Agreement on forming joint-fact finding group> 
1. Media Related Law  
1) Proposals of Copyright Law, Digital Broadcasting Transfer Law would be 
handled in the current National Assembly  
2) 4 Proposals of Broadcasting Law, Newspaper Law, IPTV Law, and Information 
Communication Law would be handled and voted in June Interim National 
Congress through the process stated by the National Congress Law. In the mean 
time, a consultative organization under the jurisdiction of the “Culture, Sports, 
Tourism, Broadcasting and Communication Committee” consisting equal number 
of members recommended by Ruling and Opposing Parties would be formed in 
the beginning of March. This organization would be a social-deliberation 
organization which would take process such as collecting public opinion for 100 
days in the “Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting and Communication 
Committee” After such process is over, would the voting process regarding the 
law proposals would be handled in the June Interim National Assembly for 
vote….                           March 2nd 2009.  
Signed:     Grand National Party Floor Leader:   Hong, joon pyo  
Democratic Party Floor Leader:      Won, hae young 
      Sunjin and Changjo Coalition Floor Leader:  Moon, guk hyun 
      (Source: Memorandum of Agreement, March 2
nd 
2009)  
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To test whether the joint-fact finding met the conditions for a positive consensus building 
some criteria should be drawn as below.  
<Criteria for assessing joint-fact finding in ROK-Medial Law passing>  
① Credibility of the initial memorandum of consensus 
② Availability of Ground rules  
③ Analysis of structure and members 
Related to such criteria some positive and negative aspects could be concluded.  
Firstly, it seems that creating a memorandum signed by all interest parties’ representatives in 
the initial stage was a positive aspect to boost credibility among the stifling parties.  
Although, memorandum itself does not have strong bounds as a contract, signatures from all 
represented parties give parties fear to risk in breaking the ground rules during the 100 day 
deliberation and the coming June Interim National Assembly. Moreover, equal numbers of 
agents within the committee gave balance in power for a fair. However, there were some 
negative aspects of the interpretation of memorandum that remained unresolved. After the by-
election results of April 29
th
, the newly elected floor leader of Democratic Party, 
Congressman Lee, Kang rae in his inauguration announced as following. 
“The public opinions re-confirmed through the result of April 29th’s by-election which led 
the total defeat of the Grand National Party that the vicious media law proposal should not be 
voted. Since such change of circumstance, the initial proposal should be rescinding” 
(Yeonhap, May 20th)  
In response to such statement, the floor leader of Grand National Party congressman Hong, 
joon pyo responded as following: “Then- representative of Democratic Party had requested 
directly of putting a vote in June as well as composing of the Media Development National 
Committee. Talking about change in circumstance now is absurd since the contents of the 
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memorandum were received upon request of Then- representative of Democratic Party” 
(Yeonhap, May 20th) 
Democratic Party’s spokesman Noh,young min explained that “The then- representative of 
Grand National Party, Park hee tae proposed that if promising to put vote the matter, we 
would consider delaying the issue 6 months later. Then, representative of Democratic Party, 
Jung, se kyun of course denied such proposal. However, due to the forewarning of chairman 
of the National Assembly, Kim hyung oh to lay the bill using direct authority, it was 
undesirable but to compromise”  “The two that we compromised were the 100 days of 
period and clause to vote and the two that we received in return were forming of deliberation 
organization, the Media Development National Committee and the clause of passing law 
through receiving public opinions” (Yeonhap, May 20th) Grand National party floor leader 
Kim, jung kwon refuted that “The mediation process was achieved when the Democratic 
party did not have place to retreat. Therefore it is not wrong to state that it was on behalf of 
request that the memorandum of consensus was yielded. Also, it is a ridicule to abolish the 
memorandum of consensus on the excuse of change in the floor leader, when the 
representative who requested the consensus still remains” (Yeonhap, May 20th) Such shift in 
position, indeed havoc the credibility of the memorandum which later affected difficulty for 
interest parties in implementing other clauses based on ground rules  
Also, the obscurity of the sentences mentioned in the memorandum was another problem.  
The expression of “collecting public opinion” was not defined within the memorandum. 
Since the Media Development National Committee was dismantled due to the interpretation 
of “collecting public opinion”, specific definition should have been made. The interpretation 
of the Grand National Party was that the memorandum did not mention anything about public 
polling. To their interpretation “collecting public opinion” was considered as no more than a 
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reference for “voting” in the June Interim National Assembly. However, the Democratic Party 
narrowed the meaning of “colleting public opinion” to a public polling although, not 
specifically mentioned in the memorandum. Contrast of interpretation is well documented in 
the final report of the Media Development National Committee as following 
“The Grand National Party, in discussing the means of collecting public opinions, 
discouraged the public polling along limiting the number of public hearings. In other words 
there was vast contrast in the recognition collecting public opinions. Grand National Party 
narrowed the scope of actors regarding the collecting public opinions to the committee 
members of the committee, not the general public. On the other hand, the Democratic Party 
interpreted the role of Media Development National Committee as a social deliberation 
organization for public collecting. It was positive in receiving guest from general public as 
well as professionals in the media which led to conflict between the Grand National Party” 
(Media Development, pp27-28) 
19
 
Such neglect of specific definitions within the memorandum exposed risk of the Media 
Development National Committee to be eventually dismantled. 
Secondly, the ground rules for an effective convening and facilitation in the committee did 
not meet with satisfaction.  Although making a slim consensus on the structure of how the 
committee should be organized such as the installing of sub-committee or the agendas to be 
treated, the committee had initiated its deliberation without the procedural ground rules for 
facilitation from the very beginning. For instance, in the second general meeting, harsh 
                                           
19 Reason why only the final report submitted by the opposing party was referred in this paper is 
because the Grand National party’s report does not have any description on how the actors 
within the committee were involved. The report merely focuses on the agendas that were 
deliberated. Since, this paper is not focused on the justification of ROK Media Law, but to identify 
the structural flaws for consensus building, Grand National party’s final report is omitted.  
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disagreement arose whether to expose the process of deliberation through the media. Even 
after the 6
th
 general meeting, neither the selection of the sub-committee nor the 
implementation of public polling was set as a ground rules. According Such manners to 
decide ground rules in ad hoc situation while preceding the deliberation process affect bad 
facilitating.  
Thirdly, there were structural flaws within the committee as well as the members itself to act 
as an apolitical joint-fact group. To be specific, there must be an analysis on the structure of 
the committee. Since, the Media Development National Committee was the first precedential 
joint-fact finding group in the history of ROK National assembly during session, it is 
important to note that the group was entangled amidst a political struggle between the ruling 
party and the opposing parties. Reviewing that the group was formed by the recommendation 
by each parties, it could be assumed that parties were the principal actors whereas the 
members being the agents. As criteria for a model joint-fact finding should be a neutral group, 
the selection process of the members exposed high possibility to be used as agents reflecting 
the interest of the principal actors. Of course, to reduce the political influences turning into an 
adversary science, there were some instruments such as putting 10:10 balance of numbers 
among the committee as well as putting dual Joint-chairmen so that the facilitators could be 
cross checked.   
 
Table No.4 <List of Joint Fact Finding Group Members> 
No. Name Occupation Recommended from Role 
1 Kang, sang hyun Professor DP Joint Chair 
2 Choi, young mok Professor DP Member 
3 Lee, chang hyun Professor DP Member 
4 Cho, joon sang 
Chairman, 
Research 
Institute 
DP Member 
5 Ryu, sung woo Labor union DP Member 
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NGO 
6 Park, min NGO DP Member 
7 Kang, hye ran 
Women 
Union NGO 
DP Member 
8 Kim, ki joong Lawyer DP Member 
9 Park, kyung shin Professor Sunjin/Changjo Member 
10 Moon, jae hwan Professor Sunjin/Changjo Member 
11 Kim, woo ryong Professor GNP Joint Chair 
12 Hwang, gun Professor GNP Member 
13 Kang, gil mo 
Chairman, 
NGO 
GNP Member 
14 Choi, hong jae NGO GNP Member 
15 Byun, hee jae 
Company, 
CEO 
GNP Member 
16 Lee, hun Lawyer, NGO GNP Member 
17 Yoon, suk hong Professor GNP Member 
18 Choi, sun kyu Professor GNP Member 
19 Kim, young 
Ex-CEO, 
MBC 
GNP Member 
20 Lee, byung hae 
Ex- 
Anchorman, 
KBS 
GNP Member 
(Source: Media Development, pp28-29)  
However, such check-balance structure could not fundamentally remove the committee 
members to be apolitical. According to Susskind, criteria for selecting joint fact finding 
experts should include fair selection process. He states that “A consensus building group must 
design a fair selection process that allows for the identification of the most qualified and 
affordable candidates who will be acceptable to all parties”(Susskind, 1999). In the Media 
Development National Committee case, it may have been fair considering the balance of 
number to counter-check influences by the principals, but the recommended members were 
“not acceptable to all parties”. Non-existence of denial mechanism against each party’s 
recommended list made it possible for the committee to be formed. However, putting 
members that have high political incentives only meant shifting the arena among principals to 
arena among agents. The analysis of records of each committee member proves such 
assumption to be standing. For instance, Kim woo ryong and Hwang, kun recommended by 
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the ruling party previously participated in the “Declaration of 100 intellectuals demanding the 
revision of Media Law” Moreover, committee member Byun hee jae, Kang gilmo, Lee hun 
was affiliated with the NGO, “Media Development National Coalition” which strongly 
demanded the privatization of KBS. In the criteria of recommending members by the 
opposing parties, Democratic Party stated as following: “Additional to their expertness and 
field experience, we considered logical combativeness and team work as an important criteria. 
(March 12
th
 ,Kyunghyang)”. Thus, under such structure of win-lose perception dominating, 
the purpose of the joint-fact finding groups had high possibility to gain political stance, 
therefore excluding any apolitical joint-fact finding to properly function.  
 
7.2.2 Role of Mediator and Facilitator after the failure of joint fact finding  
Although mediator or facilitator should be perceived neutral to all interest parties in order to 
achieve successive consensus building, mediator or facilitator within the political arena is 
difficult to achieve this status. Reasons are amply explained in the previous sections. 
Regardless of such difficulty, it could not be denied that some actors did play as a mediator or 
facilitator during the consensus building process-That is the role of Chairman of the National 
Assembly Kim hyung oh and Grand National Congresswoman, Park Gun hye. It is interesting 
to compare with other previous studies in which mediators are expected to be secluded from 
becoming a stakeholder. However, in the case of ROK Media Law passing, both players were 
stakeholders which make this study significant for future studies. Only few studies have been 
conducted on the matter where mediator also acts as a stakeholder. Therefore, analyzing the 
failure as a mediator and facilitator in the ROK Media Law passing could deepen the 
understanding of the reality of the ROK politics to achieve successful consensus building.  
Before studying the unique role of Congresswoman Park, gun hye as a mediator, the 
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position of Park gun hye and her supporters should be understood as mentioned in section 5.1. 
To sum, before acting as a mediator, Park gun hye and her potential supporters served as a 
separate interest group within the Grand National party. The potential number of seats 
supporting her made Grand National Party impossible to unilaterally whims power over the 
opposing parties. Such pre-condition made it possible to reach agreement on taking a joint-
fact finding among the interest parties while delaying the voting process until the coming 
June Interim National Assembly.   
According to Moore and Christopher’s study in categorizing types of mediator, Park gun 
hye roughly fits with the “Vested interest mediator” As a Vested Interest Mediator, she had 
the “leverage or coercion to achieve an agreement” (Moore, Christopher) Her strength of 
possibility in changing the whole outcome was based on her voting power. Thus, when she 
criticized that the initial proposal of Grand National Party had “risk of welcoming monopoly 
of public opinion” and suggesting her own alternatives, the static status of the political arena 
shifted once again. Responding to her alternative solution, both the Democratic Party and the 
Grand National Party returned to the “negotiating table”. From the Grand National Party, a 
new revision of alternatives were drawn giving in some compromise while the Democratic 
Party members relaxed their muscles of non-negotiating mode and returned to the “table”  
It could be judged that the “Vested interest mediator’s” strategy may have fostered positive 
outcomes. Nevertheless, such mood for deliberation was short-lived due to the coming “dead 
line” for voting mentioned in the previous section.    
 
Table No.5 <Types of Mediators > 
Types of Mediator 
Social Network  Benevolent Administrative / Managerial  Vested Interest  Independent  
Prior and 
expected future 
Mayor may not 
have a current or 
Generally has ongoing 
authoritative relationships 
Has either a 
current or 
Neutral / 
impartial 
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relationship to 
parties tied into 
their social 
network 
ongoing 
relationship with 
parties 
with parties before and after 
dispute is terminated 
expected future 
relationship with 
a party or parties 
regarding 
relationship 
and specific 
outcomes  
Not necessarily 
impartial, but 
perceived by all to 
be fair 
Seeks best 
solution for all 
involved 
Seeks solution developed 
jointly with the parties, within 
mandated parameters  
Has a strong 
interest in the 
outcome of the 
dispute 
Serves at the 
pleasure of 
parties 
Very concerned 
with promoting 
stable long-term 
relationships 
between parties 
and their 
associates 
Generally 
impartial 
regarding the 
specific 
substantive 
outcome of the 
dispute 
Has authority to advise, 
suggest, or decide 
Seeks solution 
that meets 
mediator’s 
interests and / or 
those of a favored 
party 
May be 
“professional 
mediator 
Frequently 
involved in 
implementation   
Has authority to 
advice, suggest, or 
decide 
May have resources to help in 
monitoring and 
implementation of agreement 
May use strong 
leverage or 
coercion to 
achieve an 
agreement 
Seeks a jointly 
acceptable, 
voluntary, and 
non-coerced 
solution 
developed by 
the parties 
Generally has on-
going 
relationships with 
parties after 
dispute is 
terminated 
May have 
resources to help 
in monitoring and 
implementation of 
agreement 
Has authority to advise, 
suggest, or decide  
May have 
resources to help 
in monitoring or 
implementation 
of agreement 
May or may 
not be involved 
in monitoring 
implementation 
May use personal 
influence or peek / 
community 
pressure to 
promote 
adherence to 
agreement 
  
May use strong 
leverage or 
coercion to 
enforce 
agreement 
Has no 
authority to 
enforce 
agreement 
(Source : Moore, Christopher, Table 2.1. Types of Mediator) 
 
However, there should be a critical analysis on studying the outcomes of the re-negotiation. 
The Revised proposal and the 2
nd
 Revise proposal 
20
 of Grand National Party drawn after 
the forewarning of the Chairman in using direct power, all seemed to measure the “Zone of 
Possible Agreement” according to Park gun hye’s proposal. In other words, alternatives raised 
                                           
20 In July 21st, the Grand National Party drew its second revised alternatives. Compared to the first alternative it 
yielded more compromises. The contents included 10% limitation of ownership by the Conglomerates and 
Newspaper as well as accepting Park Gun hye’s proposal in allowing 30% of limitation for Conglomerates in 
owning General Program Service and Special Coverage Program Provider. Also it agreed in installing a anti- 
public monopolization organization. 
38 
 
by the Democratic parties were not considered as a serious matter to be dealt. 
21
. Such 
analysis concludes that a “vested interest mediator” could always turn tides on behalf of its 
own interest. In the case of Park gun hye, her interest laid more in bargaining with the 
alternatives which she proposed. What lies underneath such interest is her objective “not to 
leave any more precedential of abuse of direct authority driven by the majority party 
(Hangook Kyung Jae, July 20
th 
2008)  With such demeanor, her mediating skills were 
limited in not able to deliberate interest reflecting the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the 
mediation process done by Park could not be blamed upon since she also had an objective as 
a congresswoman to act as an interest party which goes prior to the role as a mediator. In fact, 
the case of Park gun hye actually proves some positive aspects in studying the structural 
flaws of ROK National Assembly. Regardless being a vested interest mediator, Park’s 
demeanor of deliberating against the ruling and opposing party was agenda-centered. Unlike 
the other Grand National Party congressmen who used joint fact finding as an adversary 
science to deny any claim pointed out by the opposing party, her active listening skills as a 
mediator gave credit over even the opposing party.  
 
Table No. 6 Alternatives from the original proposal 
22
 
( ) is the alternative of Park, gun hye, < > is the2nd alternative proposal of Grand National party  
Owners / 
Objects 
Individual Stock Share Conglomerates  Newspaper / Broadcast Foreign Capital 
Conventiona
l 
Revise
d 
Conventiona
l 
Revised 
Conventiona
l 
Revised 
Conventiona
l 
Revised 
Ground 
Wave TV 
30% 49% Prohibited 
20% 
<10 %
> 
Prohibited  20% Prohibited  
Prohibite
d  
                                           
21 The cross-ownership matter which the Democratic Party strongly opposed shifted to the original plan  
22
 Regarding the alternatives by Park, gun hye, she also requested to add clause to limit the “Share of Audience 
Ratio” by 30%. In response, the Democratic Party, suggested below 25 %. Grand National Party’s alternative 
proposal compromised in delaying cross-ownership implementation of the Newspaper and Broadcasting by 
2012 while limiting “Share of Audience Ratio” by 30% using German style of regulation  
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General 
Program 
Service 
30% 
 
49% 
Prohibited 
30% 
<30%> 
Prohibited  
30% 
Prohibited  
20% 
Special 
Coverage 
Program 
Provider 
49% 
(30%) 
<30%> 
49% 20% 
General 
Cable 
Program 
- - - - 49% 49% 49% 49% 
Satilite 
Broadcast 
- -   Abolish 33% 49% 33% 49% 
General 
Program 
Provider  
- - - - - - 49% 49% 
(Assorted from various Newspapers) 
In contrast, the demeanor of Kim hyung oh as a facilitator and mediator had shown intrinsic 
structural flaws which the ROK National Assembly have. To assess Kim hyung oh’s 
effectiveness in building a consensus as the chairman of the National Assembly; his scope of 
role should be reviewed. Legal stature of a chairman must “gain political neutrality” since 
most convening process in a national assembly is conducted by the conferred authority of the 
chairman (Shin myung soon, 2000).  
 
Table No.7  
<Roles and Functions of a Chairman of National Assembly> 
  Role and Function 
Facilitator 
Promote stability and predictability of the legislative system 
Mediator 
 Limit conflicts within the National Assembly while coordinate and 
resolve conflicts 
 Secure the opportunity of the congressmen in giving out opinion 
and make sure whether submission of law proposal is fairly 
implemented in the related committee  
Representative 
As a representative of the legislative body, conduct symbolic political 
activity 
Administrator  
Through deliberation with the heads of the chairman of each committee, 
suggest direction of laying a bill and gain control of the committee and 
lower legislative organization 
(Source : Kim hyun woo, 2001, Table 5-1) 
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The reality of the current National Assembly in Korea contradicts with such nominal 
expectations mentioned above, although it is clearly stated in National Assembly Law Clause 
20
23
. 
 “Virtually, the efficacy of the National Assembly Law Clause 20 is rather pessimistic. 
Reason behind such perspective is that after his or her term as a chairman is over, the ex-
chairman would automatically gain back membership from the previously affiliated party. 
Moreover, when running for an election it is possible to gain back the previous membership 
within 90 days before his or her term is over. Since the term is only limited for 2 years, the 
chairman tends to weigh more on future position within the previously affiliated party rather 
than emphasizing on his or her current role as a chairman... Past empirical data proves that 
the more neutral the chairmen were, the higher risk returned of them not being re-elected for 
as congressmen” (Korea National Assembly Development Research Committee, 2002) 
The failure of Chairman’s facilitation and mediation was due to such political affiliation 
intrinsic in the role of Chairman. His frequent forewarning of using “the direct authority” 
gave discredit among the opposing parties. Since the opposing party in a weaker stance to 
vote, threatening to use such means only gave strong assumption of the hidden political ties 
he may have been influenced. Also, his conference of power to the vice chairman to use 
“direct power” and such power resulting in the laying of bill amidst deliberation violated the 
ground rules of convening (Constitutional Court, 2009). Such flimsy demeanor as a 
facilitator and mediator eventually resulted in the proxy voting of Grand National parties to 
pass the bill which was later reprimanded of breaking another ground rules.  
 
  
                                           
23
 It states that the Chairman of the National Assembly cannot be affiliated with any political parties and remain 
neutral   
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Table No 8 
<List of participated voters (Grand National Party, Chin Park Coalition, Jayu Sunjin)> 
Bold letter and Underlined = Proxy Voter / Shaded area = Potential Suspects of Proxy Voting 
Kang yong Suk Go seung duk Ko heong gil Kong seong jin Gang Kil bu 
Goo sang chan   Kwon kyung suk Kwon young sei Kwon young jin Kwon taek gi 
Kim moo sung Kim sun dong Kim seong soo Kim seong shik Kim seong jo 
Kim yeong sun Kim young woo Kim ok i Kim young tae Kim jang soo 
Kim tae won Kim tae hwan Kim hak song Kim hak young Kim hyo jae 
Park dae hae Park min shik Park bo hwan Park sang eun Park soon ja 
Park jin Pae young shik Pae eun hee Paek sung woon Seo byung soo 
Song kwang ho Shin sang jin Shin seong bum Shin young soo Shin ji ho 
Ahn hong joon Ahn hyo dae Yeo sang kyu Won yoo chul Won hee ryong 
Yoo jae joong Yoo jeong bok Yoo jeong hyun Yoon sang hyun Yoon seok young 
Lee du a Lee myung kyu Lee bum gwan Lee bum rae Lee byung suk 
Lee yoon sung Lee eun jae Lee in ki Lee jeong seon Lee jeong hyun 
Lee chul woo Lee chun shik Lee hak jae Lee han goo Lee han sung 
Rim du sung Rim tae hee Rim hae kyu Jang kwang gun Jang yoon suk 
Jeong du on Jeong mong joon Jeong mi kyung Jeong byung kuk Jeong yang suk 
Jeong tae gun Jeong hae gul Jeong hee su Cho moon hwan Cho won jin 
Cho hae jin Chu gwang duk Chu sung young Chu ho young Chin sung ho 
Choi gu shik Choi byung gook Han seon kyo Heo bum do Heo won jae 
Hong sa duk Hong il pyo Hong jang pyo Hong jeong wook Hong joon pyo 
Kang myung soon Kang seok ho Kang seong cheon Kang seung kyu 
 
Kim gwang rim Kim Kum rae Kim ki hyun Kim dong sung 
 
Kim seong tae Kim seong hoi Kim sei yun Kim so nam 
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Kim jae kyung Kim jung gwon Kim jeong hoon Kim choong hwan 
 
Na gyung won Na sung rin Nam gyung pil Park gun hye 
 
Park young a Park jeong kun Park jong hee Park joon sun 
 
Seo sang gi Seong yoon hwan Seon bum kyu Son sookmi 
 
Shim jae chul Ahn kyung ryul An sang soo Ahn hyung hwan 
 
Won hee mok Yoo ki joon Yoo seung min Yoo il ho 
 
Yoon yeong Lee kyung jae Lee kye jin Lee gun hyun 
 
Lee sa chul Lee sang duk Lee sung hun Lee ae ju 
 
Lee joeng ku Lee jong hyuk Lee joo young Lee jin bok 
 
Lee hae bong Lee hye hoon Lee hwa soo Rim dong gyu 
 
Jang je won Jeon yeo ok Jeon jae hee Jeong gap yoon 
 
Jeong ok im Jeong ee hwa Jeong jin suk Jeong jin sup 
 
Cho yoon sun Cho chun hyuk Cho jin rae Cho jin hyung 
 
Chin soo hee Chin young Cha myung jin Choi gyung hwan 
 
Heo chun Heo tae yul Hyun gyung byung Hyun ki hwan 
 
Hwang young chul Hwang woo yeo Hwang chin ha Kim hyung oh 
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8. Overall analysis and Conclusion / Policy Recommendations 
Q4. .If the conventional means to reach consensus building proves to be ineffective, what 
structural problems of the legislative system in Korea were revealed through the ROK Media 
Law passing? 
In conclusion, the failures of consensus building approach above prove that adherence of 
ground rules is important to be recognized among actors. Nevertheless, the diagnosis that was 
conveyed in the previous sections: From the initial stage of conflict escalation by using 
violent means as filibustering, failure of Joint fact finding and the analysis of failed 
facilitation and mediation all prove that underneath the motive of such lies a common 
misperception- A misperception that compromise over rivaling party’s request would 
decrease its own influence. With such agitation to win over other parties, ground rules are 
seen as a thin line between exploitation and an obstacle. Therefore the structure of consensus 
building should be conveyed in reducing or improving such misperception. For instance, 
during the Joint fact finding, the structure was designed with no difference between the 
struggles inside the National Assembly. The committee itself could be described as a reduced 
scale of agent’s struggle acting behalf their recommenders. Therefore, it was easy to become 
an adversity science group. Also, the facilitation and mediation of the chairman clearly shows 
that ground rules of being neutral do not properly function as it should be. This is due to the 
nature of his future expectation of post-term to return to his former- affiliated party.. 
Moreover proxy voting and the non-neutral facilitation by the vice chairman during the 
voting process explicitly shows that ground rules could be easily manipulated. These all 
proves that the structure of the National Assembly have tendency in neglecting the ground 
rules in order to win superior position of one’s rival. However, some positive aspects in the 
ROK media law case could be also found. Although structural flaws of weak obeisance to 
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ground rules and misperception of “using harsher forces guarantees victory” is wide spread in 
the ROK national assembly, the role of Park gun hye as how the misconception of the actors 
in the National Assembly should be redressed. Although it is true that her shift in position in 
the later voting stage invited harsh criticism among the opposing parties, it should be noted 
that unlike Chairman Kim, hyung oh who should have acted as an “Independent mediator”, 
her role acted on behalf of an “vested interest mediator”. Therefore, there was no obligation 
for her to act neutral. Also, her style of strategy in intervening amidst a conflict was “Issue-
targeted” with “Active listening” obtained. Such demeanor gave legitimacy in fostering the 
mood of re-negotiation among parties while yielding a positive compromise from the initial 
proposal.  
The purpose of this study is to identify what lies behind the obstacles that make consensus 
building difficult. By closely observing the Media Law case in ROK, this thesis concludes 
that the main momentum of irrational consensus building occurs by thin ground rules and 
perspective of actors to obstruct the opponents. Then, Questions could be raised whether the 
reasons behind such hazard comes from actors simply not keeping the ground rules or the 
laxness of design the ground rules have. In regards to such questions, it is noteworthy of 
reviewing the process of how joint fact finding failed in ROK media law passing. As the joint 
fact finding turned out nothing more than a proxy battle of agents, recognition of opponents 
had little chance to be altered as a neutral ground for fact findings. Therefore some 
recommendations of designing the ground rules could be suggested. Firstly, the design of the 
ground rules should be aimed for reducing the source of agent problem since joint fact 
finding’s main purpose is to convey an objective fact finding that could be agreed among all 
actors. Referring to the U.S jury system’s ground rule of selecting a jury could be a good 
future study in this matter. Also known as Voir dire in legal term, it is a mean used to select 
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potential juries from both sides of prosecution and defense. The essence of the process is that, 
the candidate pools of either side are cross-checked by questionnaires prepared by the 
opponents. After going through carefully designed questioning, if some candidates of the 
opposite side are perceived to be ‘biased’, the prosecutor or the defendant could deny those 
candidates in becoming jury. Only after repeated cross-checking leading to a consensus of the 
list of jury, the court is opened. Purpose of such design is to eliminate any possible agents of 
either sides of prosecutor or the defendant influencing the verdict. Thus, the U.S jury system 
has basic frame work of being credible among all actors. On the other hand the joint fact 
finding process in ROK media law passing did not have such credibility checking system 
which merely started off when the list of recommended actors of both parties were formed. 
Without any credibility secured, the existing recognition of rivalry would not had been 
abolished which subsequently distorted the process of joint-fact finding to be highly 
subjective. Therefore, credibility check system should be existed from the selection of 
candidates for joint-fact finding group. Since the chairman has strong executive power to lay 
a bill without any consensus being made, framework of balancing the abuse of “direct 
authority” should be studied for future studies to minimize its abuse 
Secondly, regarding the mediating and facilitating role of the chairman of the National 
assembly, previous sections showed that the chairman is easily manipulated by his previous 
affiliated party due to his expectation after the term of chairman is over. In regards to this 
matter, limited access of references denies specific alternatives to be suggested within this 
thesis. However, as the National Assembly Development Research Committee points out in 
“Research on the Leadership of the Chairman and the Management of the National 
Assembly”, research studies related to improve such structural flaws are currently under 
budgeted. (Leadership, National Assembly Development Research). Therefore, 
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significance of identifying the structural problem of the chairman as a mediator and facilitator 
itself, would give rough hints for future studies to improve the limits that were revealed in the 
chairman’s role. It should be admitted repeatedly that only limited amount academic research 
are implementing dealing with the problems. Therefore, due to the fact that data were mostly 
collected by interviews and journal articles, some assessment may be incorrect. However, 
since only a few academic works are done on the consensus building dynamics in the current 
ROK political system, this study may give some positive implications for future studies to in 
addressing the obstacles for a better alternative consensus building modeling in politics.  
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